QUEEN'S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER

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FINDING OUR WAY

NAVIGATING THROUGH A CONFLICTED WORLD

FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Queen's International Affairs Association is a truly unique student club that gives its members opportunities to experience their interests in world affairs in a variety of ways. QIAA is an ever-growing, multi-faceted organization which organizes conferences, participates in international model UNs and civil society groups, hosts speakers series, advances humanitarian initiatives, and publishes this journal as well as an annual internship guide.

QIAA's core activities are supported by our 9-member, elected executive committee, but the heart and soul of the association is our general membership. Every year, 150 students join QIAA, making us one of the biggest clubs on campus, and one of the largest student IR clubs in Canada. It is our members' energy and enthusiasm that make this club possible and it is their unending creativity that pushes us to try new initiatives each year.

This year, we are taking on some bold new initiatives, most notably the Canadian Foreign Policy conference in Ottawa and this bi-monthly journal, both of which we hope will help to invigorate greater discussion among students, academics and practitioners within the Queen's community on international issues.

This inaugural issue presents a variety of ideas and experiences of the international system. Finding our way in this world is a daunting task – yet, with a discourse such as this, we can navigate through, prepared for what is out there.

I encourage you to get involved with QIAA and continue reading QIO throughout the year, as we will bring you articles you will not be able to find anywhere else.

QIO

*The **Queen's International Observer** is a bi-monthly publication of the Queen's International Affairs Association, containing articles and comment on world affairs, as well as reviews on QIAA activities. QIO will attempt to bridge the divide between students, academics and practitioners by giving all the opportunity and a forum to present ideas. We will attract the brightest thinkers, with the most forward-looking opinions on international affairs and bring them together in one publication.*

Editor Ashley Henbrey
Publisher Andrew Schrumm

We would like to thank all of our contributors to this issue. Without your hard work and generosity, this publication would had never have been more than an idea.

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

Ashley Henbrey QIO Editor

On Sunday August 22nd, the United States claimed they brought a little bit of democracy to Cuba when they flew 130 cargo planes over the island broadcasting 'Radio Marti'. Radio Marti is an eighteen million dollar broadcasting project created by the US government. The purpose of the project, as described by Mel Martinez the co-chair of the commission that recommended the flights, is to allow for the "unfiltered transmission of information" into Cuba. US Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in an interview with American press, described Sunday's launch as "wonderful day for the enslaved Cuban people" and an important step in the fight against the Cuban government's dictatorship. Radio Marti, which is ironically named after Jose Marti (a beloved Cuban poet whose works greatly inspired the revolution), is another example of the American government's attempts to interfere in Cuban affairs. There is long, complex, history of troubled relations between the two nations, and problems persist today. The tensions are largely the result of a discrepancy between what external powers, such as the American government and the American media, perceive to be the 'Cuban reality' and the actuality of life in Cuba. Unfortunately, ignorance breeds ignorance, thus the international community remains largely in the dark about the nature of the Cuban nation, its government and its people.

This spring I participated in the Queen's course known as Developing Ethics or DEVS 309. The course involves spending two weeks in Cuba, with approximately forty other Queen's students. While in Cuba we attended lectures at the University of Havana, as well as touring throughout Havana and the surrounding countryside. The purpose of our trip was to gain a better understanding of the Cuban nation, and its people. Our instructors emphasized the importance of questioning what we observed and engaging in meaningful debate with those we encountered. Our mission was to gain a better understanding of the 'real Cuba'.

I expected the unexpected prior to my travels to Cuba, and I was not disappointed. I discovered a people, a culture, and a sense of community unlike any other in the world. The Cuban people's dedication to ideals of equality and social justice is remarkable. They continue to establish institutions that benefit their entire national community, as well as the global community. For example the Escuela LatinoAmericana De Medicina is an institution which trains Cuban and Latin American students in the field of medicine for no fee. The medical school is part of the Cuban effort to combat doctor shortages in Latin America and around the world. For Cubans, education and health care are held in the highest regard. Furthermore, Cubans believe in their political system, and active participation in the political community is always encouraged. Cuba is a patriotic nation, its people strongly united by their past and proud of their present society. Cubans appear optimistic for the future, confident they will continue to prosper and advocate ideals of social justice.

In order to be realistic about Cuban society, however, one cannot deny that there exists certain problems. The conditions of housing and transportation, as well as, frequent resource shortages remain a concern for many Cubans. Furthermore, the incorporation of the U.S. dollar into the Cuban monetary system has caused some of its citizens to question the country's commitment to Socialism. The increasing wealth discrepancy between those who work in the tourist industry and those who do not, is disconcerting for many. Cubans who work in

the tourist industry have access to US dollars, often this means they make more money than professionals like doctors and professors. Whether this trend will become a major dissatisfaction is yet to be seen.

The largest threat to the stability of Cuban society remains external forces. The most recent attack against Cuba comes from US President Bush and his implementation of new economic sanctions. Bush has further restricted Americans travel to the island and limited the amount of money Americans can spend in Cuba to fifty US dollars a day. Additionally, due to political pressure from the US, Panama's out-going president, Mireya Moscoso, as pardoned four anti-Cuban terrorists. The terrorists had been imprisoned for crimes that violated Cubans' human rights, including the bombing of a Cubana flight in 1976 which killed 73 innocent people.

There are those who speak out for Cuba however, many throughout the international community who fight against anti-Cuban measures. A growing number of individuals and organizations seek to inform the global community of injustices being committed against the Cuban nation. The newest sanctions and the pardoning of the Panama prisoners, have spurred several protests throughout America and around the world. Pro-Cuban activists, including many Americans, continue to write letters, produce publications, and organize rallies informing the public about injustices committed against Cuba.

In Kingston there is a great amount of support for Cuban solidarity. The Kingston Canadian-Cuban Friendship Association is composed of a dedicated group of individuals who attempt to create awareness about Cuba's positive aspects. They are part of a larger Canadian network that endeavors to establish friendly relations between Canada and Cuba. However, public support for pro-Cuban organizations and projects is not always adequate. For instance, at Queen's the Developing Ethics course is continually under threat of cancellation, despite the efforts of certain faculty and the overwhelming support from student participants. It is difficult to understand the administration's resistance to DEVS 309. Developing Ethics offers students with an opportunity to apply their critical-thinking skills, to be challenged in a unique learning environment, and to expand their understandings of another nation. The continuation of the DEVS 309 program is essential, if the University wishes build upon its reputation as a progressive institution that supports innovative thought.

In short, Cuba has much to offer the global community. Cubans are strong people, who have remained united and survived the direr conditions. Furthermore, Cuba is a nation rich in natural resources; it is an economically desirable trading partner in terms of its tobacco, coffee, and sugar industries. It is also culturally unique; Cuban art, music, and dance are distinctly vibrant, and have a passionate flavour that is unmistakable.

It is necessary that Canadians and others within the international community do not simply speak of Cuba superficially. Critical thought is imperative when evaluating the media coverage of Cuba. I encourage all to become further informed about Cuba, and to consult a variety of sources when researching current events. A greater global understanding of Cuba would be beneficial to every nation. Perhaps most importantly, understanding Cuba is necessary for the survival of those most harmed by misconceptions, the Cuban people.

Ashley Henbrey *is editor of the QIO, and is a fourth-year history/philosophy student.*

For further information about Cuba try the *www.wuta.com/wcc* website, *http://www.radiohc.cu/ingles/noticias/noticiascuba.htm*, and *www.granma.com*.



Paul Martin's Asia-Pacific Vision

Kim Nossal **Head, Political Studies, Queen's University**

The following lecture was delivered to the Asia-Pacific Ambassadors' Forum in Ottawa on 27 August 2004:

It is, I recognize, rather mischievous to entitle my talk "Paul Martin's Asia-Pacific Vision." The title of course implies that there *is* an Asia-Pacific vision; but I want to argue that the Martin government in fact has no Asia-Pacific vision; indeed, it has no broader foreign policy vision of its own. However, I also want to suggest that this is not at all unusual.

Mr Martin came to the prime ministership in December 2003, and has been in power for some nine months, and in all his major pronouncements on foreign policy, and in all the major actions of his government in the realm of external policy, the Asia-Pacific has been noticeably absent. In asserting this, I am sure that I am not telling you anything new. I am sure that you and the staff at your embassies and high commissions have noticed that in all his major foreign policy addresses to date, the prime minister has actually never used the words Asia and Pacific in the same sentence, let alone together.

I am sure that you have noticed that in all these major addresses, the only time he has mentioned any of your countries has been in the context of his idea for a G-20 of government leaders comparable to the G-20 finance ministers. Otherwise, he has been completely silent on such major regional issues as the India-Pakistan relationship, terrorism in the Asia-Pacific, relations across the Formosa Straits, or the process of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.

Now it is true that the major event on the annual prime ministerial calendar that forces all Canadian prime ministers to say the words Asia-Pacific not only in the same sentence but in the same breath is just around the corner, and of course the prime minister will fire up his speech-writers to pen some appropriate words for the occasion that he will work on while flying down to Santiago in September.

But dragging out last year's speeches for a required state occasion like the annual APEC leaders' meeting is not the same as actually having an important region on your mind enough that it would make its appearance in the statements of your government.

But the lack of an Asia-Pacific vision is, I would argue, part of a broader phenomenon: it can be argued that the Martin government's broader foreign policy vision has yet to emerge.

If you look carefully at Mr Martin's major pronouncements on foreign policy in the last nine months, and look at the major foreign policy decisions taken by his government, it can be argued that what one sees is a foreign policy vision that has yet to take shape.

To date, the major foreign policy achievements of the Martin government have been in two areas. First, the prime minister moved immediately to reorganize the bureaucratic structures related to international affairs – splitting the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, establishing a new architecture for the conduct of Canadian-American relations.

Second, Martin tried to move as quickly as he could to try to repair the damage done to Canadian-American relations by Jean Chrétien 2003, not only the decision of the Chrétien government to

sandbag the United States on participation in the Iraq war at the last moment, but also Chrétien's decision to tolerate a number of anti-American/anti-Bush comments by officials in his office, in his cabinet and in his caucus. He did this largely by personal diplomacy with George Bush at the Monterrey Summit and a trip to Washington in April. But there has been little else to suggest a broader vision of Canada in the world. By contrast, the foreign policy pronouncements of the Martin government over the last nine months have been heavy on the kind of feel-good rhetoric about foreign affairs that was so much the mark of the Chrétien era. In particular, Martin seems as entranced as Chrétien by the idea that all one needs to do in foreign policy is invoke Canadian "values."

Consider this excerpt from the prime minister's Address in Reply to the government's first Speech from the Throne in February:

> *Peace and freedom, human rights and the rule of law, diversity, respect and democracy — these are the values that form the foundation of Canada's experience and our success. They are, in truth, potentially our most valuable export.*
>
> *For this reason, we must take up the challenge of building democratic societies — assisting countries broken apart by conflict and giving them life and hope.*
>
> *One of the distinct ways in which Canada can help developing nations is to provide the expertise and experience of Canadians, in justice, in federalism, in pluralistic democracy.*

This is what many academics call Ottawa's "values-projection" project – in other words, where Canadian foreign policy becomes the projection abroad of abstract values like "justice," "federalism" and "pluralistic democracy."

But this is something straight out of the Chrétien era, strongly suggesting that Martin does not have his own vision of international affairs and Canada's place in contemporary global politics.

Indeed, the only one new "big" foreign policy idea floated by Martin in the last nine months is the idea of convening a G-20 meeting of leaders to replace the G-8. Not a bad idea as ideas go – but the idea has not been fleshed through enough. Moreover, the idea has been floated in a typical Canadian way: simply announced with lots of publicity – yet another Canadian diplomatic initiative – trumpeted by the Canadian government in order to gain maximum domestic political gain.

For the rest, the government has been responding to events in entirely reactive fashion: trying to implement an superficial election promise to create a 5000-person peacekeeping force; responding to the American timetable for the implementation of national missile defence; quarrelling with the government of Iran over the death in custody of a journalist who had entered Iran on an Iranian passport but who also happened to be a Canadian citizen.

Now it is true that Ottawa is immersed in an International Policy Review, or IPR. This will be the first foreign policy review since 1994, and I suppose the prime minister could say that its foreign policy vision will be revealed in that review.

But if the prime minister is waiting for an IPR to give his foreign policy some direction, that merely confirms the view that Mr Martin's foreign policy vision has yet to emerge.

This sounds critical, but it is not meant to be. For it is not at all unusual for a Canadian prime minister to take over 24 Sussex Drive without having a clear foreign policy vision.

The last leader who came to power with a fairly well-worked out foreign policy was Pierre Elliott Trudeau. When Trudeau took over as leader of the Liberal Party – and thus as prime minister – in 1968 he brought with him a well-worked out critique of Canadian foreign policy—and a relatively clear vision of what kind of foreign policy his government would want to pursue.

But Trudeau was usual. Brian Mulroney and Jean Chrétien are much more usual in the Canadian experience.

Brian Mulroney came to power in September 1984 without a broad foreign policy vision. He had a limited critique of Liberal foreign policies under Trudeau. Mulroney criticized the Trudeau government for allowing relations with the United States to deteriorate; he criticized Trudeau for allowing Canada's defence and alliance contributions to slide.

Mulroney's foreign policy vision in 1984 was simple—and very simplistic: a Conservative government, he promised, would reverse the deterioration in Canadian-American relations–"refurbish" was the word he liked to use. Under a Conservative government, Canada would be, in his words, "a better ally," by spending more on defence and by supporting the United States more in global politics.

In power, however, Mulroney's Conservatives developed a much more complex foreign policy than one might have expected on election day in September 1984. For the Conservative government was one of the most activist governments in foreign policy in the post-1945 period.

By 1993, when Mulroney resigned as prime minister, his government had signed a free trade agreement with the United States—something in opposition in 1983 and 1984 he had promised not to do—and then followed this by signing a trilateral free trade agreement with Mexico and the United States. His government had withdrawn Canadian troops from Europe. His government had gone to war alongside the United States—in the Persian Gulf in January and February 1999. His government developed a robust human rights and good governance policy. His government had expressed sympathy for the use of force by the ANC in South Africa. Mulroney himself openly endorsed the idea of using force for humanitarian intervention. His government had openly encouraged the disintegration of another federal state – by advocating the independence of Ukraine. In short, when you look at the Mulroney government's foreign policy from the perspective of 1993, you would not recognize the government that came to power in 1984.

With one important exception: in 1984 Mulroney promised that he would refurbish Canada's relationship with the United States – and that he did. Not before or since has a Canadian prime minister enjoyed such a good relationship with an American president as Mulroney developed with George H.W. Bush, or, to a lesser extent, with Ronald Reagan.

The same applies to Jean Chrétien in 1993. Chrétien came to power with a highly simplistic approach to foreign policy: he judged—correctly—that the Canadian electorate was not happy with how close Mulroney was to the United States, and simply resolved to put some distance between Ottawa and Washington.

It might be noted that embracing anti-Americanism was an instinct that came naturally to Chrétien and many of those in his cabinet. If you want a good picture of the deep anti-Americanism of both Chrétien and his front bench, read the long debate that the Mulroney government conducted on the eve of the first Gulf war in January 1991 when Chrétien was the leader of the opposition. So anti-American were the speeches of the Liberal opposition members that the former leader of the party, John Turner, who was working as a lawyer in Toronto but had not yet resigned his seat in the House of Commons, was moved to fly to Ottawa, take his seat in the House of Commons and give a speech that was strongly critical of his own party's anti-Americanism.

But in 1993, Chrétien's anti-Americanism served him and the Liberal Party well – he was able to tap into a sense among Canadians that under the Conservatives relations with the US had grown simply too close. So during the 1993 election campaign, Chrétien simply promised that he was going to put some distance between himself and the White House. He also promised that Canada would pursue a Chevrolet foreign policy, not the Cadillac foreign policy of the Conservatives.

Not much of a foreign policy vision. But like Mulroney before him, Chrétien would develop a foreign policy vision over his decade in power. He ended up being very close to Bill Clinton, even though given his 1993 election promises he had to hide their good relationship as much as he could. He developed the Team Canada approach to international trade relations. He encouraged the development of an activist foreign policy under his foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, pursuing such initiatives as the treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines and an International Criminal Court. He too went to war alongside the United States—against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. But he stayed out of the war against Iraq in 2003, sensing correctly that the Canadian public was not buying the justification for war against Iraq.

In short, like Mulroney, Chrétien ended up developing a foreign policy vision by being in power rather than having a vision of international politics that was he brought to power with him.

This should not be very surprising. Canadian politicians do not win party leaderships with foreign policy visions. Foreign policy writ large is so fundamentally unimportant to most Canadians that there is no need for candidates for leadership to develop and articulate such visions. But once in power, Canadian prime ministers discover that they are thrust into the need to develop foreign policy. A foreign policy vision emerges over their time in office.

But in the Martin government's case, its foreign policy vision may not emerge for a while—primarily because of the dynamics of minority government.

Canada's last minority government was Joe Clark's short-lived government that lasted from June 1979 to February 1980. Minority governments change the political dynamic, and I want to argue that in this case the government's minority in the House of Commons will have an impact on foreign policy.

The minority situation will make the government cautious about taking bold steps in foreign policy.

Instead, Mr. Martin will only take foreign policy initiatives that are impossible to avoid – the case of national missile defence is one such initiative. The Americans have made it clear that they are going ahead – is Canada going to be in or out? The Martin government calculates that it would be highly

damaging for the Canadian military and for Canada more generally to be "out," so we will be "in" – despite the opposition of the New Democratic Party and many in the Liberal caucus.

A measure of this caution can be seen by how Mr. Martin has treated Carolyn Parrish, one of his MPs who this week derided those who support missile defence as a "coalition of idiots." In other circumstances, Mr. Martin would likely have moved to expel Parrish from the Liberal caucus – because her intemperate comments are so damaging to his efforts to repair the relationship with the United States. But in a minority, Mr Martin will criticize, but will not go further.

The same caution, I would suggest, will be seen in all those aspects of foreign policy that do not fall in the imperative category. The government will limit itself to peddling feel-good ear-candy about the importance of Canadian values in international affairs, and embracing safe policy options. After all, a diet of pablum and blanc-mange is much easier to digest in a minority situation.

In other words, it will not be until the Liberals find the right time to go to the electorate that they will do what they did in 1974: cause their own defeat in the House of Commons, go back to the electorate, and secure a majority.

And it will only be when Mr. Martin has a safe number of Liberal MPs behind him that we will see the emergence of a broad foreign policy vision. And that vision might even contain an Asia-Pacific vision.

***Dr. Kim Nossal** is a professor, author and Head of the Political Studies Department of Queen's University.*

Are you interested in international affairs and current events? Are you looking to pursue a career in politics, law or diplomacy, while learning from speakers involved in these fields? Would you like to hone your debating skills, while interacting with a diverse and energetic group of university peers? Then the 20th anniversary of the Queen's Model United Nations conference is the conference that you should register for this fall.

Queen's Model United Nations (QMUN) conference is a four-day, annual simulation of the United Nations system, held on the beautiful campus of Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario from November 18-21, 2004. Led by Secretaries-General Christine Kostiuk and Erin Wiley and their team of experienced organizers, Canada's outstanding small collegiate model UN is committed to providing a unique, highly participative MUN experience, with exciting, crisis driven committees, inspiring speakers, and a professional secretariat, in an intimate setting.

In celebration of its 20th anniversary, QMUN is proud and honoured to present Stephen Lewis as its keynote speaker. As the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa, Stephen Lewis will be able to provide delegates with an experienced insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations, as well as acting as a role model to many of the conference's delegates.

Queen's Model United Nations is centered around six selected committees where the delegates representing all the countries of the United Nations are given the platform to debate and discuss topics that are both crucial and current to international affairs. The committees chosen this year represent a diverse range of topics, covering security, development, human rights and international legal issues, including the establishment of order in Haiti, war crimes in Iraq, and the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.

*For further details as to the specifics of the conference, registration, or regarding any other questions, please check out the website at **www.myams.org/qmun** or email QMUN at **qmun@ams.queensu.ca**.*

Kevin Rex Arts '95, QIAA Alumni

As I sat there, hands clammy, voice shaking, looking up at the three sets of eyes, all staring at me from behind their pulpit, I choked. I didn't have a good answer, wasn't quick enough, didn't quite make the cut. They looked at each other, quickly, disapproving, then moved on to the next candidate, a good friend of mine seated on my left. He was insightful witty, and despite his shaggy appearance, I knew he would make it.

And so I waited for a few days until it was ready. There, posted in the JDUC for all to see, was the list of those interviewees who had successfully made the QIAA cut. My name was not among them.

And so began my journey to the United Nations. A keener kid from down-town Toronto, the only one from his graduating class of 120 to make it to Queen's, and in my first week rejected from what had always been a dream, to be a UN delegate, even if it was just for pretend.

Undaunted I applied again the next year. Perhaps inspired by my recent success as a Gael, I wowed the interview board. Well actually I spilt coffee on one of the executive. I then explained my name was John Smith, an exchange student from Luxembourg. They were adequately amused and QIAA, at long last, adopted me as one of their own.

I understand there are no more interviews for members, probably just as well, my ego can only take so much abuse. I share this story, in part for your amusement, but also as a cautionary tale. The road to one's dream is seldom straight and flat.

Three years later I managed, barely, to graduate from the hallowed halls of Queen's, hell bent on joining the Foreign Service. The FS, however, took the occasion of my graduation to change their application policies, all candidates now required a Masters. I had not been a good student, occupying my time with debating, QIAA, Model Parliaments and the AMS exec. Talking was fun, writing exams was not.

Long story short, 2 years working in Japan, 2 years of grad school at Carleton and NYU, some success with government exams and interviews, and suddenly I found myself taking a huge pay cut, but proudly working as an Officer at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). To be honest I am still convinced there is some really clever guy named Kevin Rey out there, who can't understand why he didn't get the CIDA job. I think some HR person just extended the "y" long enough to make it look like an "x", and well here I am.

Every year the government sends 7 "junior" officers to the UN for the General Assembly. One of those officers is always from CIDA, assigned to cover the multitude of resolutions and negotiations that deal with development issues. And so I eagerly applied to the internal competition.

It was a strange QIAA flashback, as I looked up into the eyes of my interview board. But the QIAA process had taught me well and this time I was selected to represent Canada on the Economic and Financial Committee of the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (man I love saying that).

If you are reading this, I imagine you have done at least one model UN. So what is the real thing like? The same! I kid you not. OK the building is

nicer.... well most of it is. The Russian delegates are from Moscow, not McGill, and you can't move to have a delegate censured, just cause they burned you, but otherwise just the same.

It took some time for this realization to sink in. During my first week, as I approached the gates of the UN, my red delegate's badge swinging from my

The United Nations Headquarters in New York city is both a functioning office building and a monument to peace.

neck, I half expected the security guards to stop me. The first time I opened my mouth in one of the negotiating rooms, I fully expected giggles, or gasps of horror. The truth was that my insecurities were all bottled up in me, and were probably shared by a lot of the other delegates there. Heck, I had a distinct advantage, at least English was my first language, and all negotiations happen in English.

And so as the weeks went on, so too did my confidence grow. Before I knew it the Ambassador had me delivering a speech on Canada's commitment to financing for development (copies now available on the UN and Government of Canada web site, tell all your friends).

I was never a super athlete, never once kidded myself that I could make the NHL or an Olympic team. But for me, representing Canada at the UN was just as monumental as getting drafted by the Leafs. When I spoke, I spoke for my country. And, despite what you may hear, when Canada speaks, people listen. Sure the Americans are bigger, the EU speaks with the voice of 25 countries and the Chinese with the voice of several billion people. But, believe it or not, Canada's delegates have a strong reputation as bridge builders, and insightful thinkers. We are neighbours to the Americans, and close friends to the Africans. Brothers and sisters with the Europeans, and advocates for the small developing countries. Our unique positioning, as a middle power that punches above its weight, allows us to be the intermediary, the voice of compromise.

Sadly the voice of compromise is not the stuff of headlines, and our work behind the scenes will almost always go unnoticed by the world at large. But do not believe for a second that we are any less the international player because of it. There are literally dozens upon dozens of resolutions passed at the UN every year, that were brokered by a quiet unassuming Canadian delegate. Whether he was the Ambassador working behind the scenes with the Permanent 5 of the Security Council, or just some lucky Queen's grad, given the opportunity of a life time. Being the "nice guy" or the nice country, may not sound sexy, and it may never get you top billing. But in a world of egos and bombs, sometimes it takes a nice country to come along and stroke the former, so as to avoid the latter.

Not everyone who joins QIAA will want to work for the government. Nor should you. There is gold in them thar hills, and we need some rich folks in this country. But for those who choose to make the public service their career; while you may never be rich, I promise you will never be bored. There is literally a whole world of opportunity that awaits you. Just one, among those thousands of opportunities, is at Canada's Permanent Mission to the UN. And believe me when I say, there is nothing more rewarding or thrilling, than representing the greatest country on earth.

Kevin Rex *is currently a Foreign Policy Analyst with the Global Affairs Secretariat of the Privy Council Office.*

By Paul Heinbecker

This paper is meant to discuss two important and distinct but intersecting challenges to international stability and then propose some ideas for dealing with them. The first challenge is micro-political, more specifically, American exceptionalism, and the consequent uses and misuses of power. The second challenge is macro-political, specifically the diplomatic sclerosis of the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations, and their tendency towards inertia in the face of change. Each of these challenges is difficult and the context in which they intersect is potentially a very dangerous one.

Originally presented in Berlin, Germany, June 2004.

The Context

With respect to the US - European relations, the Atlantic, already politically wide at the end of the Cold War, is getting wider. Common values, notably with respect to human and civil rights, which were once simply assumed to unite America and Europe (and Canada) in both aspiration and practice, can no longer be so taken for granted. Attitudes towards economic and social rights, never identical, seem as divergent as ever. Beyond values, trans-Atlantic interests, which were never fully concentric, seem to overlap even less than they used to. More worrisome, in the Arab world, to paraphrase a recent US commission on public diplomacy headed by Edward Djerejian, a former US ambassador to Israel and Syria, the bottom has fallen out of support for the US. The attitudes towards the US in most Islamic countries are likewise negative. In Latin America, the US-engineered regime change in Iraq evoked memories of the Monroe Doctrine and a hundred years of US intervention. Globally, with respect to security, there is little common threat-perception. Outside the United States, few perceive terrorism in the existential danger terms that Americans do, that would warrant the kind of general mobilization that Soviet Communism did. Most others seem to see that threat more in terms of economic disruption and individual safety, of clogged borders and personal inconvenience, of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, rather than of a war and a danger to national security.

There is correspondingly little or no agreement in the world on how to respond to "terrorism", beyond sharing intelligence where interests do coincide sufficiently, tightening up travel regulations insofar as governments can agree to do so and denying the use of the international financial system by known terrorists to the extent feasible.

There is a risk, albeit still a manageable one that the US "crusade" in the Middle East will morph into a prolonged conflict between the West and Islam. A religious war in an age of asymmetric warfare is a danger that wise people, on all sides, know that they must do all they reasonably can to circumscribe. Meanwhile, the UN is suffering a loss in international esteem, disappointed by some for not endorsing the war in Iraq, distrusted by others for not preventing it.

Incidentally, bringing Turkey into the European Union would be convincing evidence that the EU wishes to live in cooperation with Moslems, not in confrontation with them or isolation from them Such a step would confound Islamic extremists, undermine their popular appeal and diminish their support base for a jihad against the West. It is not a little paradoxical that many of the Europeans who see EU foreign policy as more enlightened towards Islam and the Middle East than American policy find it so difficult to embrace Turkey. Making Turkey a genuine partner in the European project would show that the EU can act strategically in its own interests and can resist the gravitational pulls of history and religion on this issue, too, as it has on

others. When Eastern European and other countries with substantially less democratic experience than Turkey, and with human rights records that are little or no better, are accepted comparatively readily into the Union and Turkey's entry is postponed, or rejected altogether, the argument that European resistance to Turkish membership is founded in something other than religion is not convincing.

As significant as terrorism, and Islamic and other religious fundamentalisms are politically, we face other security challenges, some much more deadly. From the Congo to Sudan to Columbia, crimes against humanity are taking literally countless lives. The number of interstate conflicts may have declined in recent years, but the proportion of intrastate conflicts has increased, and they have become more lethal for civilians. Disease is no less lethal. HIV-AIDS, malaria and childhood diseases are still more pervasive and much more deadly even than conflicts are. HIV-AIDS has taken nearly 30 million lives and threatens 40 million more. Malaria routinely takes more lives than even small arms do, let alone sporadic terrorist atrocities. After years of neglect, progress is being made on HIV-AIDS, although here, too, the international community is far from united.

Divisions over economics have, likewise, remained intractable. Progress has undoubtedly been made, particularly in Asia, especially in China and India where millions of people have escaped poverty. Elsewhere, notably in Africa, the number of people living on less than one dollar day has actually increased. The undoubted benefits of a globalizing economy notwithstanding, the world remains polarized between rich country and poor over the causes of persistent poverty and the remedies for it. The international community is not on track to achieve the economic and social goals leaders so optimistically set themselves at the Millennium Summit at the UN in New York in September 2000. Rich and poor governments, international organizations, business, and civil society organizations, all get failing grades on meeting the voluntary chosen targets from the tracking project of the World Economic Forum. Meanwhile, the problems of the commons, so long ago identified and so self-evident to the people present at this conference remain intractable, with species disappearing, fish stocks depleting, deserts advancing, forests retreating and the climate changing.

The Micro Challenge:
American Foreign Policy

As the most powerful country, the United States, of course, is at the heart of all of these issues. To an extent that most Americans probably do not realize, US foreign policy impacts on virtually every issue across the globe. Domestically, in the United States, the exercise of power is governed by a system of checks and balances between the executive, congressional and judicial branches and state and federal governments. No branch of government is allowed a free hand. Abroad, however, successive American administrations have progressively come to realize that after the demise of the Soviet Union, US foreign policy faces no external check or balance. The US can be neither compelled to act nor prevented from doing so. Others, particularly other industrialized countries, have ceded leadership increasingly to Washington, in part because of the US's sheer capacity to lead, in part because others saw (and still see) no international threat to themselves or, more disgraceful, no obligation to others, which would warrant substantial investments in military capability. Many have preferred to spend their tax resources and parliamentary effort on domestic needs, where political demands are most urgent and political rewards most sure.

As a consequence of the leadership role that the US both sought deliberately, and, also, acquired by default, many in Washington on both sides of the political aisle

In attacking Iraq over the objections of undoubtedly the great majority of UN members, the US put itself offside of world public opinion.

have come increasingly to regard the US as bearing a disproportionate burden and meriting, therefore, exceptional dispensations from international law and norms. Such American "exceptionalism" is not a new phenomenon–it dates from the arrival of the Puritan arrival in North America—although it has taken on new currency.

Exceptionalism unquestionably has had its positive as well as its negative consequences. The US has exercised exceptional leadership, for example, in the development of post-war institutions, in the promotion of human rights and the development of international law, in the containment of Communism and the defeat of the Soviet Union, and in the preservation of stability among Japan, China, Russia and the Koreas. (It is also the case that from Iran in the fifties, to Cuba and Vietnam in the sixties, to Chile in the seventies, to Iraq and Afghanistan in the eighties, the US has chalked up some exceptional errors.)

But it is the more self-serving manifestations of exceptionalism that have, inter alia, led to an American questioning of the applicability of the UN Charter to the United States, indeed of international law per se. Witness the advice to President Bush, recently made public, that he was not bound by the Torture Convention or the Geneva Protocols. Or consider the oft repeated view of many in Washington that obtaining UN Security Council blessing of US military action against Iraq was merely discretionary. In its opposition to the International Criminal Court, US pressure on the UN Security Council amounted to an abuse of process. US actions violated the UN Charter, itself, and were seen by many as exceptionalism taken to extreme lengths, as the US sought, ultimately unsuccessfully, to enshrine one law for the goose and another for the gander. That the US has dropped its effort in the Security Council to secure

blanket immunity for its troops from ICC jurisdiction is welcome, as much for the principled opposition of the Security Council that led to the decision as for the American circumspection it entailed.

It has become a truism that 9/11 "changed everything". While 9/11 demonstrably did not actually change everything, there is no doubt it did change some important things, especially in the conduct of American foreign policy. Influential Americans, especially but not exclusively the "neo-cons", persuaded themselves that the potential nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction meant that the US could best, in fact, only assure its security by the US acting free of the constraints of international law, multilateral institutions and quarrelsome allies. Allies were considered in Washington to owe the hegemon a decent loyalty, at least when it decided that an action was in its vital interest, as in Iraq. Bookshelves are groaning under new treatises about American Empire, about Mars (the US) and Venus (the EU) and about the inevitability of American dominion, all justifying, one way or another, American exceptionalism.

Post 9/11, the US Administration propounded a national security strategy that posited not just pre-emption, which is foreseen in international law, but prevention, which is not. The difference is far from legal hair-splitting. The post World War II system is anchored in the proscription of the use of force except in self-defence and except with Security Council acquiescence. Customary international law provides for pre-emptive self defence, but pre-emption entails rigorous tests on the part of the protagonist as regards the seriousness and immediacy of the danger and the absence of effective alternatives remedies. It, also, entails judgements about the capability and intent to do harm on the part of the adversary. It, further, presumes both very high quality intelligence, which as we know was catastrophically absent in the Iraq case, and sound interpretation of that intelligence, which was equally tragically missing.

The reason for going to war in Iraq was actually preventive, that is, to bring down a tyrant with weapons development capabilities and presumed malevolent intentions. It was presented, however, as pre-emptive, that is to stop a tyrant who already had weapons of mass destruction and terrorist links and was immediately prepared to use them, or to subcontract their use to a terrorist organization.

At no time in the winter of 2002 and the spring of 2003 did it seem to register in official Washington that a large majority of UN member states disagreed that war in Iraq was necessary and urgent and that their objections were not just the regrettable but temporary by-product of "decisive" American leadership, to be endured until the policy vindicated itself, but a disagreement that mattered especially to the US's prospects of success there. US action undermined the UN, called into question the very idea of international law (although not international trade law) and harmed the major interests of virtually ever other country. No one in a position of influence in Washington seemed to consider that if reasonable countries disagreed, perhaps their arguments for restraint deserved consideration, not derision.

The national security strategy created a second, longer term problem when it articulated hegemonic intent which, if implemented, could eventually generate major wars in the future. More broadly, in declaring war on terrorism post 9/11, essentially on a heinous tactic but a tactic nonetheless, not on a tangible enemy such as the Al Qaeda network, Washington gave itself "mission impossible". In attacking Iraq over the objections of undoubtedly the great majority of UN members, and despite the sketchiest of links between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime and no hard evidence of weapons of mass destruction, the US put itself offside of world public opinion. In portraying terrorism in monolithic terms, Washington allowed others in the Middle East and beyond to pursue their discrete and disparate issues under the same banner as the US and may have set the stage for a larger conflict with Islam.

The Macro-Political Challenge: UN Sclerosis

In attacking Iraq against the will of the international community, and in mishandling the occupation, the US did itself, and the UN, incalculable harm. It would be wrong, nevertheless, simply to lay all the UN's misfortunes at Washington's door. The UN Charter was written in and for a different age and treats national sovereignty as a near absolute and immutable good. As a consequence, over time a contradiction has arisen between the most basic purpose of the UN, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and one of its cardinal tenets, the proscription of interference in the internal affairs of states. Because most wars, the Iraq war being a significant exception, currently arise within the borders of existing states, the inhabitants often cannot be protected from the scourge without intervention from the outside. There is no consensus internationally, at least yet, on how to respond to this new reality. Equally, there is no agreement on how to reform the aging, unrepresentative Security Council, still the most important political/security body on earth.

Most fundamentally, the UN's strength, its universal membership, has become also its weakness. Membership has swollen to 191 countries, making the achievement of consensus on any issue a Sisyphean task. This has led some, including more moderate Americans, such as Ivo Daalder of Brookings who served in the Clinton White House, to call for an Alliance of Democratic States that would either function within the world organization or outright replace it. The common values at the core of an Alliance of Democracies, it is argued, would earn the respect of Americans, confer legitimacy on its decisions in the eyes of democrats everywhere, which would in turn more readily galvanize action, including military action. This respect, it is asserted further by some, has been definitively forfeited by a UN dominated by despots, human rights abusers and inconsequential micro-states.

The impulse to do better is understandable because the

need for a more reliable, effective and conscientious instrument for use on humanitarian crises is very real. The democratic caucus thesis, nonetheless, confers more rectitude on democracies than an examination of history supports. Democracies rarely war with each other but they have been capable, nonetheless, of self-serving political chicanery. Worse, and contrary to contemporary fable, some democracies have been quite willing to go to war, and have justified their doing so by virtue of the importance of the mission conferred on them by history and in light of their own self-proclaimed righteousness and peace-loving character.

In any case, the UN membership is already two-thirds free or partly free, according to the non-partisan US organization, Freedom House. The trend is clearly in the direction of further democratization. While cooperation among democracies can be enhanced, the UN's utility derives in part from its ability to engage with the non-democracies among its members. It is precisely the non-democracies whose behaviour needs most to be influenced and engaging them has proven more availing in this connection than isolating them has.

Some American proponents of an alliance of democracies seem to assume that such a group would more readily support US policies. This theory ignores the fact that resistance to US policy on Iraq was led in the Security Council by democratic governments. It has, also, been the case that NATO, which is an alliance of democracies, has not always endorsed US policy, notably on Iraq.

There are other ideas for international governance innovation that would complement the UN not compete with it. Perhaps the most promising is the Canadian Government's idea to expand the G-8 economic summit to perhaps 20 members drawn from the leading countries from the south as well as the north. Such a forum would be more representative of current political and security realities and yet small enough to allow participating heads of government to tackle common issues efficiently and to commend solutions to the larger community. Prospects for progress on HIV--AIDS and other communicable diseases, on trade and agricultural subsidies, on terrorism and WMD, on protecting the innocent, on international financial reform, on the Millennium Development Goals and not least on the reform of the UN itself would be enhanced if leaders narrowed differences among themselves authoritatively and directed their officials and UN delegations accordingly. The UN would retain its unique legitimacy by virtue of its universal membership and its indispensable security role as framed in the Charter and international law.

It is evidence of the UN's resilience that despite the many difficulties it faces, the organization has persevered and, even, begun to rally. Member countries have, by and large, come to accept again both that multilateral cooperation is a necessary means to some important ends and that the UN is indispensable to the good management of international relations not irrelevant to it, as President Bush queried in his UN General Debate statement in September, 2002. The Iraq experience has reconfirmed that the general concurrence of the world expressed through the UN remains necessary to confer legitimacy on acts of war and that that legitimacy is a prerequisite to broad-based, effective cooperation in the management of war's aftermath.

Most governments have come to the realization that the UN per se is central to global cooperation. In an integrating world, it is more evident than ever that overarching economic and social problems, such as climate change and communicable diseases, can best and often only be resolved globally. This is not to say that the UN's deep--seated problems can safely be ignored. Anyone who has spent a frustrating afternoon in the Security Council or a stultifying evening in the General Assembly knows that reform is urgently needed.

What Can Be Done To Help the UN?

The most fundamental challenge UN members face is to come to a common understanding of when and under what conditions the international community is justified in intervening in the internal affairs of member states. The potential grounds for intervention include humanitarian crises, the illegal development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the provision of safe haven for terrorists to attack others, the inability of states to control cross-border crime and the overthrow of democratic governments. These are extremely difficult issues and there are understandable reasons that UN's approach to them tends to be cautious, even sclerotic. A large proportion of UN member states are former colonies, whose governments see the concept of sovereignty as a crucial bulwark against renewed domination. They are understandably reluctant to risk creating new pretexts for interference by others. They have bad memories of "the North" "helping" them, as happened 120 years ago, at the Berlin Conference of 1885, when large swaths of Africa were carved up and political entities created that were rational only in terms of European exploitation, leaving Africans with a legacy of poverty, conflict and suffering that continues to this day.

The worries of the former colonies are entirely comprehendible but they are not, nevertheless, an effective basis on which to protect the interests of their citizens, or of ours, in a changing world. This is particularly true for military intervention for humanitarian purposes. As Secretary General Annan said in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech: "[t]he sovereignty of States must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights". It would be tragic if the suspicion and hostility created by the invasion of Iraq made military intervention for humanitarian purposes even more difficult than it already is.

By the way, the Iraq war would not have satisfied most of the tests presented in the seminal report that the Government of Canada commissioned on this subject, the Responsibility to Protect. The Iraq war did not meet the commission's "just cause" threshold, because there was no "large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended". On this point, Kenneth Roth, the head of Human Rights Watch and

a former federal prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, has written that "to justify the extraordinary remedy of military force for preventive humanitarian purposes,... there must be evidence that large-scale slaughter is in preparation and about to begin unless militarily stopped. No one seriously claimed before the war, however, that the Saddam Hussein government was planning imminent mass killing, and no evidence has emerged that it was."

Removing Saddam to prevent large scale slaughter would have been justified on humanitarian grounds on at least two earlier occasions, when he attacked the Kurds with gas in 1988 and when he suppressed the Shiites at the end of the 1991 Gulf war. Waiting a decade to react to these atrocities, however, called the humanitarian motive inevitably into question. Furthermore, there is no statute of limitations on these crimes against humanity. Had Saddam, like Milosevic and some of the Khmer Rouge, eventually fallen into willing hands he would have been prosecuted. In the meantime, he had been progressively disarmed and effectively contained. Further, the attack on Iraq did not meet the test of "right reason", i.e., "to halt or avert human suffering". The 2003 US State of the Union speech scarcely mentioned Iraqis. Nor was it the last resort.

Nevertheless, while suspicions of US motives in the Iraq case might be widely held, they scarcely constitute grounds for leaving the grossly abused elsewhere to suffer what they must. "Bad cases make bad law", as lawyers in the Common Law tradition know only too well. And Iraq was a bad case with which to establish norms of international behaviour.

Kosovo was a better case. The intervention by NATO in Kosovo met the just cause threshold. Large scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing were occurring. It satisfied the precautionary principles, including "right intention", which was to halt human suffering. The Serbs had displaced four hundred and fifty thousand Kosovars before the NATO bombing began. The war was the last resort. Milosevic had a track record of human rights abuse and destruction in Bosnia and had been given every chance to desist in Kosovo. The use of force was proportional. NATO could have used vastly more destructive power than it did, although mistakes and accidents caused many casualties, usually highly publicized. There was, as well, a reasonable prospect of success in halting the suffering.
What was missing in the Kosovo conflict was the right authority, a decision by the Security Council to authorize the intervention. That authority was missing because the Russians had made it clear that they would veto a Security Council resolution authorizing intervention. But unlike in the Iraq case, on Kosovo the great weight of opinion in the UN, both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, supported the intervention as necessary, justified and legitimate if not entirely legal. What made Iraq so troubling was that the great weight of opinion in the Council and in the Assembly was against intervention, at least until the weapons inspectors had had the time to do their job.

Dharfur would also be a better case. It would meet the just cause threshold, particularly as regards "ethnic cleansing" and "large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended". Dharfur would arguably also meet the Genocide Convention test as regards the intentional destruction of a group, in whole or in part, although the Security Council has been unconscionably slow to act. Echoes of Rwanda.

Clearly, an international community worthy of the name needs to do better in protecting the innocent in Dharfur as everywhere else. That means addressing the main weaknesses the UN now faces with respect to military intervention in cases of humanitarian necessity in the Third World. In the third world, there is an historically quite understandable fear of too much outside intervention but an all too true and distressing reality of too little, as Rwanda tragically demonstrated, and the conflicts in the Congo and Sudan continue to confirm.

The Security Council's action to stop the genocide in Dharfur has been largely ignored by the Sudanese government. A Responsibility to Protect model has been proposed to cease such UN ineffectivity.

It was to try to advance agreement on this vexing question, in part, that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan established the panel on UN reform. The UN reform panel is currently engaged on this issue and there is plenty it should do. The panel ought to encourage the UNSC to establish operational guidelines that will encourage consistent and coherent action to protect the innocent. These guidelines would establish specific thresholds for action and principles to guide decision-making. The panel could do worse than simply endorse the report on The Responsibility to Protect. The UN panel should also recommend strengthening links between international human rights/humanitarian organizations and the Security Council, to improve the Council's decision-making process. The Council needs to have the clearest possible understanding of what is happening in a given conflict and to be prepared to act in a much more timely and determined manner.

Further, the panel should recommend that it be a condition of Council elections, that members assume a special responsibility for participation in the UN's military opera-

tions. Membership on the Council is a privilege that both requires a capacity to contribute to maintaining international peace and security and carries a responsibility to do so.

The panel, more fundamentally, should urge the General Assembly to modernize its interpretation of sovereignty to include the idea of responsibility as well as privilege, notably the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens. In the age of the Treaty of Westphalia, the sovereign did have responsibilities to protect his people. The General Assembly should acknowledge that when a state is unable or unwilling to acquit its responsibilities, they devolve upon the international community, to do so acting through the UN. Further, the panel should recommend the full participation of all the Breton Woods institutions in a coordinated effort to prevent war through development and to rebuild the peace after conflict. The Bretton Woods organizations have their own problems that need attention, for example, their representation and voting rights aberrations. Further, the World Bank has grown to dominate other institutions in the development field and its role vis-à-vis the regional development banks and especially the UNDP needs recalibrating if it is not to sideswipe the others. Nor is the IMF's mandate clear in a floating exchange rate world, including vis-à-vis the more powerful countries which currently can and do ignore its prescriptions. The weaknesses of these other existing bodies need remedying and the lacunae between them need filling.

The tragic losses of 9/11 raise another security challenge, one much preoccupying Americans and even those who disagreed with US action in Iraq. It is the nexus of WMD and terrorism. The critical questions are how real this issue is and whether this new danger provides a sufficient justification for outside intervention in a state's internal affairs. It is crucial that the UN reach a modus operandi on this most difficult issue if the US is to consider the UN relevant to its vital interests. On this exact point, the UN Secretary General told the leaders assembled in the UN last Fall that "we have come to a fork in the road and that we must decide whether radical changes are needed". It is important that the UN panel bear in mind the importance of reconciling the very considerable differences between the US and others on this issue, if the UN is to fully regain its effectiveness.

The International Community should help the Secretary-General to rebalance the international agenda more generally, to empower the United Nations to organize a global response to the global challenges of poverty alleviation, disease control, hunger, inadequate schooling and environmental destruction. Specifically, we need to deal with the non-military sources of conflict. We need a vision encompassing education and health, democracy and human rights and good governance. Peace cannot be built without alleviating poverty, freedom cannot be built on foundations of injustice and democracy cannot be built in contradiction of international law.

Of course, reform can only start with the hoped for wisdom of a UN panel, but there is a good deal that individual states should do. First, member countries must support the report and press for its adoption. Political parties in a position to do so must encourage their governments to speak out. European countries and Canada need to use their political capital to try to persuade Third World countries, the Africans above all, that by limiting and pooling their national sovereignty they can serve their own interests, and those of their people. We, also, can work to alleviate the concerns of Latin Americans.

We need to work also to understand, and to persuade others to address, Washington's sense of unique vulnerability. I would not presume to advise Germany or other

Kofi Annan's vision of reform gives hope for the future of a stronger, more responsive United Nations.

Europeans, unsolicited, on relations with the US. I do believe that Canadians should impart to others the particular, probably unique, insights into American motivations that we gain from geographic proximity and political and cultural propinquity. I do also believe that we must not shrink from agreeing with Washington when they are right and, equally, must not shrink from disagreeing with them when they are wrong. Today's news on the International Criminal Court confirms both the importance of "speaking truth to power" on fundamental issues. Under the pressure of international opposition, the US has shifted on Iraq, whether strategically or only tactically, time will tell.

We can, also, urge Asians devoted to the concept of Asian values to recalibrate their surprisingly strong attachment to the 17th century European idea of sovereignty.

The dream of a world governed by laws and not men, guided by justice and not just determined by the powerful remains possible. What is needed now is to bring international law and UN practice into the 21st Century. We need to make the UN relevant both to the most powerful and to the least powerful
among us.

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